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Abstract
The aggregate performance of the banking industry depends on the underlying
micro-level dynamics within that industry adjustments within banks, reallocations
between banks, entries of new banks, and exits of existing banks. Jeon and Miller
(2002a) extend Bailey, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) and Haltiwanger (1997) to
develop a generalized ideal dynamic decomposition. This paper illustrates the
ideal dynamic decomposition with return on equity of foreign and domestic Ko-
rean commercial banks from 1994 to 2000. The overall performance of Korean
banks largely reflects individual bank efficiencies, except immediately after the
Asian financial crisis where restructuring played a more important role on av-
erage bank performance. Foreign bank performance, however, largely reflected
individual bank efficiencies, even immediately after the Asian financial crisis.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E5, G2
Keywords: commercial banks, profitability, foreign banks and global advan-
tage hypothesis
1. Introduction 
Aggregate industry data hide important bank (firm or plant) level dynamics that 
collectively determine overall industry dynamics. That is, the performance of the 
aggregate industry reflects the accumulation of the underlying microeconomic dynamics 
within that industry -- that is, adjustments within banks, reallocations between banks, 
entry of new banks, and exit of existing banks. The availability of micro-level 
(establishment-level) data spawned a series of applied microeconomic research 
(especially for manufacturing industries).1 That research effort reveals more 
heterogeneity among firms within the same industry than between industries. 
The dynamic decomposition of industry dynamics typically adopts the method 
outlined in Haltiwanger (1997). Jeon and Miller (2002a) extend that method and develop 
an ideal dynamic decomposition that they apply to the U.S. banking industry from 1976 
to 2000 at the national and state-by-state levels of aggregation. Griliches and Regev 
(1995) employ the ideal decomposition method in their study of firm productivity in 
Israeli industry. Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel, and Woo (2002) briefly discuss the 
Griliches and Regev (1995) and Haltiwanger (1997) methods of decomposition, noting 
how they differ. Jeon and Miller (2002a), however, link the differences to the base-year 
weighting issue. 
 Reversing course, let us start at the beginning. Bailey, Hulten, and Campbell 
(1992) develop an algebraic decomposition of industry total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth into three effects – “within,” “between,” and “net-entry” effects. The within effect 
                                                 
1 McGuckin (1995) describes the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) at the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
upon which this research relies. Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel, and Woo (2002) provide a more recent 
discussion firm-level databases in ten OECD countries. 
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measures the contribution of surviving firms toward TFP growth. The between (or 
reallocation) effect measures the contribution of changing market share of surviving 
firms toward TFP growth, while the net-entry effect measures the contribution of firms 
entrants into and exits from the industry toward TFP growth. Haltiwanger (1997) extends 
Bailey, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) and separates the effects of firm entrants into and 
exit from the industry. Moreover, he also divides the between effect into two components 
– the “share” and “covariance” effects. The share effect measures the contribution of the 
changing share of firms while the covariance effect measures the contribution of the 
changing share of firms times the changing TFP growth of firms toward TFP growth. 
 Jeon and Miller (2002a) extend the existing decompositions by noting that such 
decomposition methods share a common index-number problem – the choice of the base 
year. Bailey, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) and Haltiwanger (1997) choose the initial year 
as the base for their calculations. Thus, the within effect measures the change in TFP 
growth at the firm level between the initial and final years weighted by the initial year’s 
market share. Jeon and Miller (2002a) derive a decomposition of within, between 
(reallocation), entry, and exit effects where the within effect weights the change in TFP 
growth, actually the return on equity in their application, between the initial and final 
years for each firm by the firm’s industry share in the final year. Finally, Jeon and Miller 
(2002a) define an ideal dynamic decomposition by combining those two dynamic 
decompositions into a simple average. Thus, the weighting of the within, between 
(reallocation), entry, and exit effects all employ simple averages of the initial and final 
year weights. In the bargain, the ideal dynamic decomposition of the industry eliminates 
the covariance effect derived by Haltiwanger (1997). 
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 We apply that decomposition analysis to the Korean banking industry – Korean 
nationwide and regional banks as well as foreign banks. As such, we provide the first 
analysis of the contributing factors to overall performance of banks in the Korean 
banking industry, measured by return on equity. That analysis also considers differences 
in performance between Korean banks and foreign banks as well as between Korean 
nationwide and regional banks. Further, the analysis examines differences in underlying 
causes of bank performance before, during, and after the Asian financial crisis. 
 Several conclusions emerge. Changes in industry return on equity largely reflect 
changes in individual bank performance, the within effect, except for Korean banks, both 
nationwide and regional, after the Asian financial crisis. Restructuring of Korean regional 
banks in response to the Asian financial crisis began before such affects hit the Korean 
nationwide banks. Korean regional banks first experienced a large reallocation effect 
followed then in the next year by an increase in the exit effect. Korean nationwide banks 
responded to the Asian financial crisis one year later than the Korean regional banks and 
largely through a reallocation effect, with little change in the exit effect (too big to fail). 
Finally, the foreign banks did not experience similar reallocation and exit effects after the 
Asian financial crisis. Their performance continued to rely primarily on the within effect. 
 The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the differing views on 
how foreign banks affect the domestic economy and describes the structure of banking in 
Korea. Section 3 outlines the derivation of the ideal dynamic decomposition with more 
details provided in the Appendix. Section 4 applies the decomposition technique to the 
Korean banking industry, including foreign banks and Korean nationwide and regional 
banks. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Roles of Foreign Banks on the Financial Crisis 
The Asian financial crisis underscores the importance of strong and stable financial 
markets for the maintenance of economic development. In this regard, some analysts 
argue that foreign bank participation in domestic financial markets strengthens the 
domestic economy. Other analysts, however, contend that the financial service industry 
possesses public-good characteristics and that the unfettered private-markets should not 
completely control credit allocation decisions. An even more stringent view claims that 
state ownership and state-mandated credit allocation must send credit to those sectors 
most crucial for economic development.  
Two alternative hypotheses can explain differences in foreign and domestic bank 
performance – the home-field- and global-advantage hypotheses. The home-field-
advantage hypothesis maintains that domestic banks generally outperform foreign banks 
because of informational and cost advantages. The global-advantage hypothesis reasons 
that banks from some other countries possess sufficient efficiency gains, allowing them 
to overcome any home-field advantages that accrue to domestic banks. Berger, DeYoung, 
Genay, and Udell (2001), for example, examine the X-efficiency of domestic and foreign 
banks in five developed countries – France, Germany, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. 
Moreover, the foreign banks also come from developed countries. They conclude that 
domestic banks exhibit higher cost- and profit-efficiencies than foreign banks, supporting 
the home-field-advantage hypothesis.  
Two different views also exist on the desirability of foreign bank entry 
(Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt, Levin, and Min, 1998; 
Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney, 2000; Levin, 1996; and Jeon and Miller, 2002b). 
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Proponents of foreign bank entry make several arguments. First, foreign banks provide 
the channel through which capital inflows finance domestic activities, which may 
stimulate the domestic economy. Second, the increased competition among domestic and 
foreign banks will improve the performance of banks and provide financial services at a 
lower average cost. Third, the experience of foreign banks in their home country may 
lead to better regulation and supervision in the foreign markets where they do business. 
 Opponents of foreign bank entry also make several arguments. First, unlike the 
optimists, the pessimists place much higher weight on the negative consequences of 
capital outflows than the positive ones of capital inflows. Second, foreign banks may 
have a competitive advantage that allows them to “cherry” pick among the available 
domestic funding options, choosing the more-profitable, low-risk options leaving the 
less-profitable, higher-risk options for domestic institutions. Finally, foreign banks from 
developed countries may introduce complexities not seen by domestic regulators and 
supervisors, worsening, rather than improving, the regulatory and supervisory process. 
 The movement in recent decades toward more-open financial markets and the 
increased activity of foreign banks in domestic financial markets suggests that the 
proponents have currently won the day. The Asian financial crisis raises the issue of the 
role, if any, of foreign banks in creating or continuing the crisis. This paper examines the 
Korean experience. 
Chase Manhattan entered the Korean economy as the first foreign bank in 1967.  
The participation of foreign banks grew at a good pace throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
but stabilized in the 1990s and then fell somewhat after the Asian financial crisis.2 
                                                 
2 From 1994 through 2000, 60 foreign banks operated in Korea – some for the full sample period, others for 
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Foreign banks came to Korea during the 1970s and 1980s, partly because they received 
more favorable treatment in certain areas than domestic banks, in order to attract foreign 
capital easily. In the mid-1980s, regulatory change began eating away at the preferential 
treatment of foreign banks. But along with the elimination of preferential treatment in 
some areas, other regulatory changes reduced barriers and restrictions on foreign bank 
activities in other areas. Thus, the playing field was basically leveled between foreign and 
domestic banks. 
 During the 1960s and 1970s, the major players in the Korean financial system 
were the nationwide banks. Regional banks, which can operate only in their own 
provinces and have a branch in Seoul, entered the scene in 1967 to encourage regionally 
based development. Plans to deregulate the financial system and place Korean nationwide 
commercial banks in the private sector began in the early 1980s. Deregulation in this 
period expanded the power of commercial banks.3 The government’s hand, however, still 
wielded a potent force, controlling interest rates on certain types of loans and deposits. 
Further, the government’s informal credit policy continued to favor selected sectors.4 
 While the Asian financial crisis produced the dramatic domestic economic crisis 
in Korea, more fundamental causes also added to its severity. The corporate sector 
overextended itself with too much investment and borrowing. Regional and nationwide 
commercial banks overused short-term foreign lending as a source of funds. Finally, the 
lack of transparency of balance sheets, income statements, and management practices all 
                                                                                                                                                 
only parts. The 60 banks include 14 each from the U.S. and Japan, 6 from France, 4 each from Canada and 
Singapore, 3 from the U.K., and 2 each from Australia, China, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, and 1 
each from other countries. 
3 Over 1980 to 1994, Gilbert and Wilson (1998) calculate that nationwide banks experienced significant, 
large productivity improvement while regional banks experienced mixed results. 
4 Gilbert and Wilson (1998) argue that the Korean commercial banking system experienced a crisis in the 
mid-1980s with significant levels of bad loans. Yet, no Korean bank failed at this time. 
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led to a crisis of confidence in Korean institutions. In sum, the Korean economic crisis 
was an “accident waiting to happen.” The Asian financial crisis threw a roadblock across 
the path of deregulation and privatization of the financial sector begun by the Korean 
government and the Bank of Korea. 
3. Ideal Dynamic Decomposition 
This section briefly outlines the steps necessary to generate the ideal dynamic 
decomposition. More details appear in Jeon and Miller (2002a) and in the Appendix. The 
basic strategy involves decomposition using periods t and t-1 as the base years and then 
combining the resulting decomposition into the ideal decomposition by computing their 
simple average. 
The return on equity ( ) at time t is defined as net income ( ) divided by 
equity ( E ) as follows:  
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Then, the change in return on equity between two periods equals the following 
expression: 
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where  and  are the number of banks that exist at time t-1 and time t, respectively. 
 is the number of banks that enter during time t and  is the number of banks that 
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Derivation:  See Appendix.  
Proposition 1 constructs a decomposition that incorporates the idea of the ''Fisher 
Ideal Index''. Entry and exit complicate matters. When comparing numbers between two 
consecutive years, exits do not exist in the second year while entrants do not exist in the 
first year. Then two alternative methods can calculate the effects of a change in return on 
equity by each bank -- weighted by last year's or this year's equity share. The existing 
literature typically uses last year's share.5 When calculating the decomposition, isolate the 
terms for the exits and entrants. Relating them to some benchmark, add and subtract 
either the overall return on equity last year or this year. Then, multiply by the sum of the 
shares, which equals one by definition. Finally, break the summation apart to allocate the 
exits and entries as well as the banks that are staying in both years.  
The existing literature decomposes the reallocation effect into two components -- 
a term that reflects changes in shares but relative to the first year's return on equity and a 
covariance term. This decomposition emerges from doing the decomposition only one 
way. The ideal decomposition identified in Proposition 1 does not include the covariance 
                                                 
5 Griliches and Regev (1995) provide an exception. 
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term (Jeon and Miller, 2002a). In addition, one can decompose other portfolio variables 
such as return on assets, equity to assets, loans to assets, and so on. 
4. Application of Ideal Dynamic Decomposition  
Our data on banks in Korea come from the Financial Supervisory Services (2001). 
Sixteen nationwide and 10 regional banks as well as 60 foreign banks enter our database 
for at least one year in the sample from 1994 through 2000. In addition, some bank 
entrances, mergers, acquisitions, and conversions occurred over the sample period. The 
within effect, ∑
=
−
∆
+staytn
i
titi
tir
1
1,,
, )2
(
θθ
, provides a good comparison of the individual bank’s 
performance from one year to the next. The reallocation effect, 
ti
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n
i
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t
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1,, )]
2
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2
[( θ , provides an effective way to measure the consequences 
of bank restructuring. 
Table 1 reports that the average return on equity for all banks in Korea exceeded 
zero before 1997. Except for from 1995 to 1996 when the change in return on equity 
slightly exceeded zero, the return on equity generally suffered negative changes, touching 
bottom in 1998 (see Table 2). In the most recent years, though, the return on equity 
improved continuously and the change in return on equity assumed positive values. Since 
the data consists of average values over years, the biggest effects occurred with the 
dramatic decrease from 1997 to 1998 and the almost equal in magnitude rise from 1998 
to 1999. 
Table 1 also shows the different experience of different bank types – foreign, and 
nationwide and regional Korean banks. Foreign banks did not experience the same 
dramatic swings in the return on equity during the Asian crisis, exhibiting positive values 
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and reaching the maximum in 1997. Essentially no correlation exits between average 
return on equity for foreign banks and any grouping of Korean banks – nationwide, 
regional, or all Korean banks. The data for Korean nationwide banks, however, reveal 
that their return on equity follows similar trends as that of all banks, since nationwide 
banks dominate the Korean banking industry. The return on equity of regional Korean 
banks after 1997 discloses that they were greatly affected by the crisis. Moreover, even 
though they recovered somewhat in 1999, they experienced a relapse in 2000. 
The information in Table 1 suggests that foreign banks benefited from two 
“global-advantage effects.” First, foreign banks exhibited a higher average return on 
equity than Korean banks – either nationwide, regional, or all Korean banks – for each 
and every year in our sample. Second, foreign banks succumbed less to the shock of the 
Asian financial crisis than did domestic Korean banks. 
Table 2 provides an additional piece of information on foreign and domestic bank 
performance. To wit, both foreign banks and Korean banks exhibited a substantial decline 
in average return on equity between 1997 and 1998, where the foreign bank decline was 
lowest. The change in return on equity from 1998 to 1999, however, shows that Korean 
banks outperformed foreign banks in recovering from the shock of the Asian financial 
crisis. In large part, that recovery by Korean banks reflects the intervention of the Korean 
government to staunch the flow of blood from the wounds inflicted on the Korean 
banking industry and the Korean economy by the Asian financial crisis. 
Table 3 demonstrates that Korean banks exited the industry largely in 1997 and 
1998, due to the crisis in 1997. Also the number of banks, both domestic and foreign, that 
remained in the industry decreased since 1995, partly because of bankruptcies, 
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acquisitions, and mergers of Korean banks in 1997 and 1998 and partly due to the more 
frequent exit of foreign banks since 1998.  
Table 4 reports the results of the decomposition analysis. The decomposition of 
all banks reveals that the within effect dominates movements in the return on equity, 
except for from 1995 to 1996 and 1998 to 1999. That is, the within effect moves in the 
same direction and with similar magnitude as the return on equity with a correlation that 
equals 0.86. The reallocation-effect, however, dominates events from 1995 to 1996 and 
1998 to 1999, especially the latter. The exit effect from 1998 to 1999 also achieved a 
noteworthy level, adding to overall industry performance. That is, those banks that exited 
possessed, on average, a lower return on equity than the average for the industry. So 
when they left the industry, industry performance improved. More useful information 
emerges when we recomputed the decompositions by bank type – foreign, and 
nationwide and regional Korean banks. 
The within-effect clearly dominates movements in the return on equity for foreign 
banks, which conforms to the findings of Jeon and Miller (2002a) for the U.S. banking 
industry. The correlation between the within effect and the change in return on equity 
equals 0.99. The reallocation effect’s much smaller relative size indicates that foreign 
banks prefer to exit from the Korean market rather than to improve their efficiency when 
their businesses experience trouble. Six foreign banks with lower profitability entered in 
1997 and 1998 while two newly entered banks in 1999 and 2000 caused positive entry 
effects. The exit effect generates a positive contribution to the change in return on equity 
(i.e., the exit of less-profitable banks, on average), except from 1998 to 1999 immediately 
after the Asian financial crisis occurred. 
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Examining all Korean banks as a group – regional and nationwide – implies that 
the within effect, once again, dominates movements in the return on equity with a 
correlation that equals 0.84. The Asian financial crisis caused the within effect to 
experience large negative outcomes from 1996 to 1997 and 1997 to 1998. Then the 
reallocation effect dominated events from 1998 to 1999 when overall bank return on 
equity recovered. Finally, the within effect dominated the further improvement in return 
on equity from 1999 to 2000. 
That pattern of events for all Korean banks more closely mirrors the findings for 
nationwide banks, then for regional banks. The correlations between the within effect and 
the change in return on equity for the regional and nationwide banks equal 0.99 and 0.77, 
respectively. The positive reallocation effect observed from 1998 to 1999 for nationwide 
and all Korean banks emerges from 1997 to 1998 for regional banks. That is, regional 
banks got about the process of restructuring about a year ahead of the nationwide banks. 
A large exit effect occurs from 1997 to 1998. The three regional banks that exit in 1997 
exhibited above average performances while the two regional banks that exit in 1998 
exhibited poorer performance on average. Finally, the Korean regional banks experienced 
a dramatic reversal of fortunes from 1999 to 2000 while the Korean nationwide banks 
continued to improve their performance. 
Because of their sheer size, changes in the Korean nationwide banks dominated 
the decomposition of movements in return on equity, no matter who else was in the 
group. In other words, the patterns observed in the decompositions of the change in the 
return on equity for nationwide banks match more closely the patterns for all Korean 
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banks or for all banks. The patterns observed for the foreign and Korean regional banks 
exhibited differences from the nationwide banks findings. 
In sum, the within effects generally dominated the movements in the return on 
equity for banks operating the Korean. That is, the change of return on equity generally 
correlates highly with the within effect. In contrast, the Asian financial crisis precipitated 
a large restructuring that caused the reallocation effect to become much more important 
from 1998 to 1999 for nationwide banks and from 1997 to 1998 for regional banks. The 
recovery from the Asian financial crisis began in earnest in 1999 and continued in 2000, 
except for the poor performance of the Korean regional banks. 
Foreign banks also fell victim to the Asian crisis, although not as significantly as 
domestic banks. Their performance, which can be measured by the within effect, went 
down after 1997. Foreign were not forced into restructuring as were the Korean domestic 
banks. That is, their reallocation effects after the Asian crisis remained relatively small 
when compared to those of the Korean domestic banks. That last observation probably 
reflects the fact that foreign banks in Korea represent a small portion of banking sector in 
Korea as well as the consolidated operations of that bank’s parent. 
5. Conclusion  
The performance of domestic and foreign banks has engaged researchers in recent years. 
Should governments invite or allow foreign banks to operate within domestic financial 
markets? Can domestic banks compete with foreign banks on domestic soil? Our paper 
considers some of the issues in this debate, focusing on the events in Korea before, 
during, and after the Asian financial crisis. 
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 Foreign banks performed uniformly better, on average, than domestic Korean 
banks. The evidence strongly suggests that foreign banks experienced a “global 
advantage” that overpowered any “home-field advantage” enjoyed by domestic banks. 
That global advantage by foreign banks was reflected not only better performance on a 
year-by-year basis, but also better response to the difficulties thrust on the Korean 
economy and financial sector by the Asian financial crisis. The intervention of the 
Korean government, however, to repair quickly the damage done to the “ship of state” 
allowed the domestic Korean banks to recover more vigorously than foreign banks over 
the 1998 to 1999 period. 
The ideal dynamic decomposition reveals that the within effect generally 
dominated movements in return on equity. The Asian financial crisis did cause a dramatic 
restructuring of the Korean banking industry, excluding the foreign banks. As already 
mentioned, the Korean government played the major role in that restructuring, attempting 
to prevent the crisis from worsening.6 As such, the reallocation effect of Korean banks 
increased dramatically during the period from 1997 to 1999. When the Asian financial 
crisis hit in 1997, the dramatic decrease in return on equity in Korean domestic banks, 
both nationwide and regional, entirely reflected the within effect. The banking system’s 
performance was buoyed from 1997 to 1998 by the reallocation effect, more so by the 
regional than the nationwide banks, as well as the exiting of banks with below average 
performance. That restructuring process continued from 1998 to 1999, with the 
nationwide banks participating more strongly than before. Finally, the regional banks 
experienced a reversal of fortunes and declining performance from 1999 to 2000. 
                                                 
6 U.S. regulators faced a financial crisis during the savings and loan debacle. The U.S. government decided 
to solve that crisis and not sweep the issues under the rug. Japan, on the other hand, has yet to address in 
any serious way the critical problems that it faces in its financial sector. Korea adopted the U.S. approach. 
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Two final issues deserve discussion. First, why did foreign banks outperform 
Korean domestic banks? One explanation may provide the bulk of the answer. Foreign 
banks, unlike domestic Korean banks, were not subject to the Korean government 
directing bank credit to selected, favored industries. In that regard, foreign banks may 
have held more diversified, less-vulnerable portfolios. Another, possibly less-plausible, 
explanation exists, however. Foreign banks, since they are much smaller than Korean 
banks, even Korean regional banks, can more easily and quickly adjust to change. That is, 
ship captains can maneuver small boats more easily and quickly than huge ocean-going 
vessels. 
Second, did foreign-bank participation in the Korean economy affect domestic 
bank performance? Demirgüç-Kunt, Levin, and Min (1998) find that greater participation 
by foreign banks tends to (i) reduce the probability of a banking crisis, (ii) improve the 
efficiency of domestic banks, and (iii) boost indirectly economic growth by improving 
domestic bank efficiency. Further, the effects of foreign bank operations relate to the 
number of foreign banks and not the size of their operations. In Korea, the number of 
foreign banks exceeded the number of domestic Korean banks in each year of the sample 
(see Table 3), although foreign banks represent a small share of the Korean banking 
market. One can conjecture that the success of foreign bank operations in Korea provided 
an important “demonstration effect,” which encouraged the Korean government to 
restructure its own banking industry. We leave that conjecture for future investigation. 
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Table 1: Return on Equity (Average) 
 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
All Banks 6.37% 4.66% 4.72% -8.17% -38.76% -15.34% -5.80%
  (76)  (77) (74) (79) (72) (63)  (60)
Foreign 8.26% 7.96% 10.70% 29.58% 9.38% 6.31% 12.15%
Banks (52)  (52) (49) (53) (51) (46)  (43)
All Korean 6.09% 4.19% 3.80% -14.19% -52.48% -19.62% -9.47%
Banks (24)  (25) (25) (26) (21) (17)  (17)
Korean 5.73% 5.63% 5.41% -14.78% -87.28% -2.25% -22.00%
Regional Banks (10)  (10) (10) (10) (8) (6)  (6)
Korean 6.17% 3.91% 3.49% -14.09% -48.59% -20.75% -8.58%
Nationwide Banks (14)  (15) (15) (16) (13) (11)  (11)
Note: The numbers in parentheses equal the number of banks entering the 
average return on equity reported. 
 
Table 2: Change in Return on Equity (Average) 
 
Year 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 
All Banks -1.71% 0.06% -12.89% -30.59% 23.42% 9.54%
              
Foreign -0.30% 2.73% 18.88% -20.20% -3.07% 5.83%
Banks             
All Korean -1.90% -0.39% -17.99% -38.30% 32.86% 10.14%
Banks             
Korean -0.10% -0.22% -20.19% -72.50% 85.03% -19.75%
Regional Banks             
Korean -2.26% -0.41% -17.58% -34.50% 27.84% 12.18%
Nationwide Banks             
Note: These numbers appear also in Table 4 along with the decomposition. 
 
 20
Table 3: Number of Staying, Entering, and Exiting Banks 
 
  Year 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000
All Banks Stay 76 74 73 71 62 59 
  Entry 1 0 6 1 1 1 
  Exit 0 3 1 8 10 4 
Foreign Stay 52 49 48 50 45 42 
Banks Entry 0 0 5 1 1 1 
  Exit 0 3 1 3 6 4 
Korean Stay 24 25 25 21 17 17 
Banks Entry 1 0 1 0 0 0 
  Exit 0 0 0 5 4 0 
Korean Stay 10 10 10 8 6 6 
Regional Entry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Banks Exit 0 0 0 2 2 0 
Korean Stay 14 15 15 13 11 11 
Nationwide Entry 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Banks Exit 0 0 0 3 2 0 
Note: Staying banks exist in both years. Entering banks exist in the second, but 
not the first, year. Exiting banks exist in the first, but not the second, year. 
For example, Korea saw one bank enter and 3 banks exit in 1996. See the 
1995-1996 and 1996-1997 columns under the All-Banks category for 
entry and exit. As another example, Korea saw 6 banks enter and 8 banks 
exit in 1997. 
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Table 4: An Ideal Decomposition of Industry Dynamics  
 
  Year 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 SUM 
All Banks Within -1.94% -0.21% -14.54% -38.10% 0.12% 11.76% -42.91%
  Reallocation 0.10% 0.28% 1.28% 7.61% 16.04% -2.33% 22.98%
  Entry 0.12% 0.00% 0.37% 0.05% 0.03% 0.47% 1.04%
  Exit 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.14% -7.24% 0.35% -6.73%
  ∆R -1.71% 0.06% -12.89% -30.59% 23.42% 9.54% -12.16%
Foreign Within -0.50% 2.19% 20.36% -19.32% -2.88% 3.52% 3.37%
Banks Reallocation 0.20% 0.02% 0.11% -0.31% -0.50% 0.71% 0.23%
  Entry 0.00% 0.00% -1.88% -0.16% 0.01% 0.88% -1.15%
  Exit 0.00% -0.52% -0.29% 0.41% -0.31% -0.72% -1.43%
  ∆R -0.30% 2.73% 18.88% -20.20% -3.07% 5.83% 3.89%
All  Within -2.14% -0.56% -20.00% -42.16% 0.23% 13.43% -51.20%
Korean Reallocation 0.07% 0.18% 1.05% 4.47% 23.92% -3.29% 26.41%
Banks Entry 0.16% 0.00% 0.96% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.12%
  Exit 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.61% -8.71% 0.00% -8.10%
  ∆R -1.90% -0.39% -17.99% -38.30% 32.86% 10.14% -15.56%
Korean Within -0.11% -0.39% -20.74% -89.50% 66.59% -21.62% -65.77%
Regional Reallocation 0.01% 0.17% 0.54% 22.17% 0.31% 1.88% 25.08%
Banks Entry 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
  Exit 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.17% -18.12% 0.00% -12.96%
  ∆R -0.10% -0.22% -20.19% -72.50% 85.03% -19.75% -27.73%
Korean Within -2.56% -0.60% -19.89% -35.61% -6.00% 15.86% -48.81%
Nationwide Reallocation 0.09% 0.18% 1.18% 1.51% 26.05% -3.68% 25.34%
Banks Entry 0.20% 0.00% 1.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.33%
  Exit 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.39% -7.79% 0.00% -7.39%
  ∆R -2.26% -0.41% -17.58% -34.50% 27.84% 12.18% -14.74%
Note: The change in return on equity equals ∆R and also appears in Table 2. The within 
effect measures the increase in average return on equity due to higher return on 
equity in each bank. The reallocation effect measures the increase in average 
return on equity due to reallocation (restructuring) of equity between banks. And 
the entry and exit measure the increase in average return on equity due to entry 
and exit of banks. Remember that the exit effect enters with a negative sign so 
that a positive (negative) exit effect reduces (increases) overall average return on 
equity. 
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APPENDIX 
 
DERIVATION OF PROPOSITION: The change in return on equity can be rewritten as  
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Therefore, we have that 
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Decomposition 2 
Adding the term in the right hand side of (A1) then ∑∑
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With (A2), we have that 
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Decomposition 3 (combining first two decompositions) 
 
Add the decompositions in Case 1 and Case 2 together, (A3) and (A4). Thus, 
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